University of Tennessee College of Law

Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law
Library
UTK Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Work

10-2019

Specialty Drugs and the Health Care Cost Crisis
Isaac Buck

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Buck, Isaac, "Specialty Drugs and the Health Care Cost Crisis" (2019). UTK Law Faculty Publications. 40.
https://ir.law.utk.edu/utklaw_facpubs/40

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Work at Legal Scholarship Repository: A
Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in UTK Law Faculty Publications by an
authorized administrator of Legal Scholarship Repository: A Service of the Joel A. Katz Law Library. For more
information, please contact eliza.boles@utk.edu.

Research Paper #386
January 2020

Specialty Drugs and the Health Care Cost Crisis

Isaac D. Buck
&
Sharona Hoffman

Wake Forest Law Review (Forthcoming 2020)

This paper may be downloaded without charge
from the Social Science Research Network Electronic library at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244

Learn more about the University of Tennessee College of Law:
law.utk.edu

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244

Specialty Drugs and
the Health Care Cost Crisis
Sharona Hoffman & Isaac D. Buck

Case Research Paper Series in Legal Studies
Working Paper 2019-15
October 2019
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244
For a complete listing of this series:
http://www.law.case.edu/ssrn

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY

SPECIALTY DRUGS AND THE HEALTH CARE COST CRISIS

Specialty Drugs and the Health Care Cost Crisis
Sharona Hoffman ∗ & Isaac D. Buck ∗∗

Specialty drugs, often dispensed by specialty pharmacies, are among
the most expensive drugs on the market. They are significant
contributors to the American health care cost problem, but in many
ways they escape public and regulatory scrutiny. Surprisingly,
medications are designated as specialty drugs by pharmacy benefit
managers (PBMs), entities that are part of the insurance industry,
rather than by the Food and Drug Administration or medical
authorities.
Specialty drugs have thus far received little attention in the legal
literature. Yet, they raise important legal and regulatory questions.
For example, there are no federal government rules (and only a handful
of state laws) concerning what “specialty drug” means. As a result,
PBMs could be motivated to designate drugs as specialty medications
because they own many of the large specialty pharmacies and stand to
profit by directing consumers to them. PBMs’ ownership of specialty
pharmacies raises troubling questions about conflicts of interest and
patient choice. In addition, the lack of regulatory pricing constraints
in the United States disproportionately affects specialty drug
consumers because of these items’ very high prices. The activites of
specialty drug manufacturers, PBMs, and pharmacies raise antitrust
concerns as well. This Article is the first to analyze specialty drugs from
a legal and policy perspective and to formulate recommendations for
regulatory interventions that are necessary to safeguard the welfare of
specialty drug consumers.
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SPECIALTY DRUGS AND THE HEALTH CARE COST CRISIS

INTRODUCTION
Andy is a Parkinson’s disease patient who visits his neurologist
every few months.
During one such visit, the neurologist
recommended that Andy try a new drug, Gocovri. 1 The drug is a pill
to be taken once a day at bedtime. 2 Gocovri could not be purchased at
a regular pharmacy. Rather, it could be obtained only through a
specialty pharmacy. Moreover, Andy had no choice of retailers. He
had to use a particular specialty pharmacy that supplied the drug only
through mail order. After a cumbersome registration process that
included multiple phone calls, he paid $1300 for the initial prescription
of thirty pills despite having good insurance coverage. 3 Andy is the
husband if this Article’s first author.
Andy had been introduced to specialty drugs and specialty
pharmacies. They are growing forces in American health care, and yet
they receive little attention in the legal literature. This Article aims to
begin filling this gap and shines a spotlight on the specialty drug
phenomenon.
Surprisingly, there are no government rules or regulations
concerning how medications receive the designation of “specialty
drug.” The term is generally understood to refer to high-cost drugs that
require special handling or administration. 4 However, it is entirely up
to pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs) to determine which drugs they
will classify as specialty drugs. 5 PBMs administer health plans’ drug
benefit programs. 6 Traditionally, they serve as intermediaries that
process and pay prescription drug claims and negotiate with
manufacturers for lower drug prices. 7 Contemporary PBMs, however,
are much more powerful than that. They also conduct drug utilization
reviews, develop drug plan formularies, set patient cost-sharing
amounts, establish clinical policies such as preauthorization
requirements, determine which pharmacies are members of the
insurer’s network, decide reimbursement amounts for network
1

Gocovri, https://www.gocovri.com/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2019).
Gocovri, https://www.gocovri.com/dosing#taking-gocovri (last visited Apr. 23,
2019).
3
The drug was prescribed early in the year, so he had not yet met his deductible.
4
See supra Part I.A.
5
See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
6
See Joanna Shepherd, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of
Pharmacy Benefit Managers by a Market Adversary, 9 NORTHWESTERN J. L & SOC.
POL’Y, 1, 7-9 (2013); Jessica Wapner, Understanding the Hidden Villain of Big
Pharma:
Pharmacy Benefit Managers, NEWSWEEK, March 17, 2017,
http://www.newsweek.com/big-pharma-villain-pbm-569980.
7
See supra note 6.
2
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pharmacies and operate mail order and specialty pharmacies of their
own. 8 In some cases, there appears to be no rhyme or reason to specialty
drug classifications. Drugs that are classified as specialty medications
by one PBM may not be designated specialty drugs by other PBMs. 9
In addition, specialty drugs are generally the most expensive
drugs on the market. 10 Thus, they are significant contributors to the
American health care costs problem. American drug pricing suffers
from an extreme lack of transparency. No federal laws or regulations
constrain manufacturers’ pricing decisions, and manufacturers are not
obligated to provide any justification for their prices. 11 It is difficult to
determine why certain specialty drugs cost as much as they do and
whether anything can be done to control their prices.
PBMs often require patients to fill their specialty drug
prescriptions through their own specialty pharmacies and further limit
participants to delivery by mail-order. 12 These constraints deprive
consumers of the ability to choose how they will obtain products that
are critical to their well-being. They also engender troubling conflicts
of interest. 13 PBMs, which are meant to serve the interests of health
plans and patients, 14 instead might be motivated by prospects of
profiting themselves by directing business to their pharmacies and may
in fact designate drugs as specialty medications in order to augment
their revenues. 15
8

Brittany Hoffman-Eubanks, The Role of Pharmacy Benefit Managers in American
Health Care: Pharmacy Concerns and Perspectives: Part 1, PHARMACY TIMES, Nov.
14, 2017, https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/the-role-of-pharmacy-benefitmangers-in-american-health-care-pharmacy-concerns-and-perspectives-part-1;
Applied Policy, Concerns Regarding the Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry,
Nov. 2015, p. 3, http://www.ncpa.co/pdf/advocacy/concerns-pbm-issue-brief.pdf.
PBMs earn revenues in part through rebates.
Rebates are discounts that
manufacturers provide to PBMs in return for agreeing to cover a drug product within
the health plan or for placing a drug in a preferred tier (such as preferred brand tier
with low patient copays). PBMs pocket a portion of the rebates rather than fully
passing them on to consumers. In addition, PBMs often charge health plan sponsors
and manufacturers administrative fees. A third source of revenue may be “pharmacy
spread” whereby PBMs reimburse a pharmacy a particular dollar amount for a filled
prescription but charge the plan sponsor a higher price for the drug and then keep the
difference. See Elizabeth Seeley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Pharmacy Benefit
Managers: Practices, Controversies, and What Lies Ahead, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND,
March
26,
2019,
at
3-5.
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/201903/Seeley_pharmacy_benefit_managers_ib_v2.pdf. See also, Applied Policy, at 2
and Hoffman-Eubanks, both cited above.
9
See infra note 82-83 and accompanying text.
10
See infra Part I.C.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See infra Part II.C.
13
Id.
14
See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
15
See infra Part II.C.
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These constraints may also implicate the antitrust laws. If
PBMs force consumers to use their own affiliated or wholly-owned
specialty pharmacies when this arrangement was not agreed to
contractually, their conduct could run afoul of anti-tying rules under
the antitrust laws. 16 Additional antitrust violations may occur if
manufacturers bundle a specialty drug that no other manufacturer
produces with other drugs that consumers could obtain from
competitors but for the bundling requirement. 17 Similarly, specialty
pharmacies might tie specialty drugs to educational and monitoring
services that consumers cannot decline to purchase. 18
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows. Part I
provides background information regarding specialty drugs and
specialty pharmacies. Part II highlights regulatory gaps relating to
specialty drug designation, medication pricing, conflicts of interest,
patient choice and antitrust violations.
Part III develops
recommendations to address specialty drug concerns. It also discusses
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a federal
statute that limits the applicability of state laws that regulate insurance.
The section offers a variety of strategies to overcome the ERISA
preemption problem. Part IV concludes the analysis.
I.

DEFINING SPECIALTY DRUGS AND SPECIALTY PHARMACIES

Specialty drugs and pharmacies are unfamiliar to many
Americans. 19 This Part explains what the two terms mean. It also
discusses the cost of specialty drugs.
A. Specialty Drugs
It is important to understand that specialty drugs receive their
designation from PBMs rather than from the Food and Drug
Administration or medical authorities. 20 Medications that are labeled
as specialty drugs are traditionally drugs that treat complex, chronic, or
rare conditions. 21 Surprisingly, however, there is no standard definition

16

See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part II.D.
18
Id.
19
Roni Shye, Specialty Pharmacy and Specialty Medications: What You Should
Know, GOODRX Jan. 7, 2014, https://www.goodrx.com/blog/specialty-pharmacyand-specialty-medications-what-you-should-know/.
20
See infra Part II.A.
21
Rabah Kamal et al., What Are the Recent and Forecasted Trends in Prescription
HEALTH
SYSTEM
TRACKER,
Drug
Spending?,
PETERSON-KAISER
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/recent-forecasted-trendsprescription-drug-spending/#item-start (last visited July 19, 2019).
17
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of the term “specialty drug.” 22 The principal determinant is often the
high cost of the drug. 23 Medicare, for example, defines a specialty-tier
drug as any drug costing at least $670 per month, while other sources
use a $600 per treatment threshold. 24 CVS Health defines specialty
drugs as follows:
First, they are expensive — the average monthly cost to
payers and patients for a specialty medication is $3,000,
ten times the cost for non-specialty medications.
Second, they can be difficult to administer. They are
often given by injection or infusion to treat complex,
chronic conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis,
multiple sclerosis and psoriasis. Third, the drugs may
require special handling, including temperature control.
And finally, patients taking these medications may need
ongoing clinical assessment to manage challenging side
effects. 25
22

Alan M. Lotvin et al., Specialty Medications: Traditional And Novel Tools Can
Address Rising Spending On These Costly Drugs, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1736, 1737
(2014).
23
Id. (relating that “one recent survey indicated that cost is the dominant factor, with
85 percent of respondents at health plans rating cost as very or extremely important
in their decision to assign the specialty designation to a medication”).
24
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, ANNOUNCEMENT OF
CALENDAR YEAR (CY) 2019 MEDICARE ADVANTAGE CAPITATION RATES AND
MEDICARE ADVANTAGE AND PART D PAYMENT POLICIES AND FINAL CALL LETTER,
(Apr.
2,
2018),
p.
233,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/HealthPlans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2019.pdf; Juliette
Cubanski et al., The Out-of-Pocket Cost Burden for Specialty Drugs in Medicare Part
D in 2019, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/the-out-of-pocket-cost-burden-forspecialty-drugs-in-medicare-part-d-in-2019/; Bradford R. Hirsch et al., The Impact of
Specialty Pharmaceuticals as Drivers of Health Care Costs, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1714,
1714 (2014).
25
Lotvin, supra note 22. See also, Jennifer Hagerman et al., Specialty Pharmacy: A
July
1,
2013,
Unique
and
Growing
Industry,
APHA,
https://www.pharmacist.com/specialty-pharmacy-unique-and-growing-industry;
National Pharmaceutical Services, Specialty Medications, https://www.ptinps.com/nps/index.php/specialty-medications/ (accessed Apr. 24, 2019):
NPS defines a specialty medication as a biologic or traditional drug,
which requires additional management for a complex, chronic, or
life-threatening condition that typically has two or more of the
following attributes:
• Treats a condition, which requires intensive clinical
monitoring of the patient.
• Requires special patient training or patient compliance
assistance.
• Requires special handling, such as storage or preparation.
• Requires special administration by the patient or the
healthcare professional.
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Historically, medications classified as specialty drugs were
administered by injection or infusion, but now the category includes
drugs that are simply taken orally. 26 Certain categories of U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approved drugs, such as biologics 27
and orphan drugs 28 are routinely classified as specialty drugs. While
most specialty drugs are brand-name medications, there are some
generic specialty drugs on the market as well, though they too have
high price tags. 29 These drugs at times serve very small patient
populations, which can fall below 10,000 patients or even be limited to
five-hundred patients nationwide. 30
•
•

Has a limited distribution network.
Has a high total cost.

26

Hagerman et al., supra note 25.
U.S. Food & Drug Administration, What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/about-center-biologics-evaluation-and-researchcber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers (accessed Aug. 5, 2019)
(“Biological products include a wide range of products such as vaccines, blood and
blood components, allergenics, somatic cells, gene therapy, tissues, and
recombinant therapeutic proteins…. Biologics are isolated from a variety of natural
sources - human, animal, or microorganism - and may be produced by
biotechnology methods and other cutting-edge technologies.”).
28
Orphan drugs are drugs for rare diseases, defined as those affecting fewer than
200,000 people. See Food & Drug Administration, Designating an Orphan
Product: Drugs and Biological Products, https://www.fda.gov/industry/developingproducts-rare-diseases-conditions/designating-orphan-product-drugs-and-biologicalproducts (accessed Aug. 5, 2019) (“The Orphan Drug Act … provides for granting
special status to a drug or biological product … to treat a rare disease or condition
upon request of a sponsor”); U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, FAQs About
Rare Diseases, https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/diseases/pages/31/faqs-about-rarediseases (updated Nov. 30, 2017) (“In the United States, a rare disease is defined as
a condition that affects fewer than 200,000 people.”).
29
Joshua Cohen, Specialty Generics: Barriers To Uptake, FORBES, Nov. 12, 2018,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2018/11/12/specialty-generics-barriersto-uptake/#6093a36c576f; Jalpa A. Doshi et al., Addressing Out-Of-Pocket Specialty
Drug Costs In Medicare Part D: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, And The Ignored,
AFFAIRS
BLOG,
July
25,
2018,
HEALTH
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180724.734269/full/
(“Prior
projections of the short- to mid-term savings from [specialty] biosimilars arrived at a
reduction in drug price of 10–50 percent, as opposed to the typical 80–85 percent
reduction in generic versions of traditional brand-name drugs”); Mark Thomas,
Generic Specialty Medications: The Paradigm Shift, SPECIALTY PHARMACY TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2018, https://www.specialtypharmacytimes.com/news/generic-specialtymedications-the-paradigm-shift.
30
Dean Erhardt, Specialty Pharmaceuticals and the Emergence of Sub-Specialty
COMMERCE,
Feb.
18,
2009,
Pharmacy,
PHARMACEUTICAL
https://pharmaceuticalcommerce.com/opinion/specialty-pharmaceuticals-and-theemergence-of-sub-specialty-pharmacy/; Sandra Levy, Specialty Pharmacies Toe the
Line between Access, Cost, and Outcomes, DRUG STORE NEWS, Oct. 3, 2018,
27
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Specialty drugs are becoming an increasingly dominant
presence in the healthcare market and account for a startling portion of
healthcare spending. 31 According to one source, in 2017, 5.8 billion
prescriptions were dispensed, but of these, only 1.9% (110 million)
were for specialty medications, and yet they accounted for over forty
percent of total U.S. drug costs. 32 In 1990, there were only ten specialty
drugs on the market, but the number grew to nearly three-hundred by
2012. 33 The Food and Drug Administration approved forty-six new
drugs in 2017, and PBMs considered eighteen of these, that is forty
percent, to be specialty drugs. 34 In 2018, PBMs designated as many
as thirty-nine of the new drugs that the FDA approved as specialty
medications. 35
B. Specialty Pharmacies
It follows that specialty pharmacies, which dispense specialty
drugs, 36 are a booming business. While they generated $20 billion in
sales in 2005, the sales figure burgeoned to $78 billion by 2014,
according to one estimate. 37
In 2017 there were approximately 730 accredited specialty
pharmacies. 38 However, the top four specialty pharmacies accounted
https://www.drugstorenews.com/pharmacy/specialty-pharmacies-toe-the-linebetween-access-cost-and-outcomes/.
31
See infra Part I. C. (addressing the cost of specialty drugs).
32
Tara Menkhaus et al., Pursuing Specialty Pharmacy Accreditation, SPECIALTY
PHARMACY
TIMES,
Jan.
25,
2019,
https://www.specialtypharmacytimes.com/news/pursuing-specialty-pharmacyaccreditation. See also, David Dross, Attention Turns to Specialty Pharmacy, 33
BENEFITS Q. 12, 12 (2nd quarter 2017) (stating that specialty drugs account for 1-2%
of prescriptions and are required by 1-2% of patients but generate 35% or more of
costs).
33
National Pharmaceutical Services, supra note 25. See also, Scott Kober, The
Evolution of Specialty Pharmacy, 5 BIOTECHNOL. HEALTHCARE 50, 50 (Jul/Aug.
2008), (stating that in the mid-1990s there were fewer than 30 specialty drugs, by
2008 there were over 200, and the number was expected to rise to more than 400 by
2018).
34
Levy, supra note 30.
35
Aimee Tharaldson, 2019 Specialty Pipeline Highlights, SPECIALTY PHARMACY
TIMES,
Jan.
23,
2019,
https://www.specialtypharmacytimes.com/publications/specialty-pharmacytimes/2019/January-2019/2019-Specialty-Pipeline-Highlights.
36
Shye, supra note 19.
37
Katie Thomas & Andrew Pollack, Specialty Pharmacies Proliferate, along with
TIMES,
July
15,
2015,
Questions,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/business/specialty-pharmacies-proliferatealong-with-questions.html;
38
Adam J. Fein, The State of Specialty Pharmacy in 2018, FIRST REP. MANAGED
CARE 28, Apr. 2018, http://drugchannelsinstitute.com/files/State-of-SpecialtyPharmacy-2018-Fein-Asembia.pdf. Specialty pharmacies can be accredited by four
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for two-thirds of prescription revenues. 39 The four are CVS Health,
Express Scripts specialty pharmacies, AllianceRx Walgreens Prime,
and BriovaRx. 40 All four industry giants are owned or co-owned by
PBMs. 41 For example, AllianceRx Walgreens Prime combined
Walgreen’s specialty pharmacy and mail order pharmacy operations
with its PBM, Prime Therapeutics. 42 Other specialty pharmacies are
either independent or owned by retail chains, health insurers,
pharmaceutical wholesalers, physician groups, or hospital systems. 43
Specialty pharmacies assert that they contribute to improving
health outcomes and lowering medical costs. 44 They teach patients how
to inject their drugs, comply with medical protocols, and address side
effects. 45 According to the American Pharmacist Association, specialty
pharmacies’ services include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

24-hour access to pharmacists
Adherence management
Benefits investigation
Communication and follow-up with the physician
Dispensing of specialty pharmaceuticals and shipping
coordination
Enrollment in patient assistance programs
Financial assistance
Patient education and medication adverse effect counseling
Patient monitoring for safety and efficacy

accrediting bodies: URAC (which is preferred by two-thirds of insurers), the
Accreditation Commission for Health Care, the Center for Pharmacy Practice
Accreditation, and the Joint Commission. Menkhaus et al., supra note 32.
39
Fein, supra note 38, at 29.
40
Adam J. Fein, The Top 15 Specialty Pharmacies of 2017: PBMs and Payers Still
CHANNELS,
Mar.
13,
2018,
Dominate,
DRUG
https://www.drugchannels.net/2018/03/the-top-15-specialty-pharmacies-of2017.html.
41
Joseph C. Bourne & Ellen M. Ahrens, Healthcare’s Invisible Giants: Pharmacy
Benefit Managers, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, May 2013, at 50 (stating that “most PBMs
own both mail order and specialty pharmacies”); Fein, supra note 38, at 29.
42
Walgreens and Prime Therapeutics Complete Formation of AllianceRx Walgreens
Prime, a Combined Central Specialty Pharmacy and Mail Services Company, Apr.
3, 2017, https://www.primetherapeutics.com/en/news/pressreleases/2017/alliancerxwalgreens-prime-release.html.
43
Fein, supra note 38, at 29.
44
Bijal Nitin Patel & Patricia R. Audet, A Review of Approaches for the Management
of Specialty Pharmaceuticals in the United States, 32 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1105,
1108-09 (2014); Thomas & Pollack, supra note 37.
45
Nick Calla, What Is a Specialty Pharmacy?, SPECIALTY PHARMACY TIMES, Dec.
18,
2013,
https://www.specialtypharmacytimes.com/publications/specialtypharmacy-times/2013/nov_dec-2013/what-is-a-specialty-pharmacy; Levy, supra
note 30; Patel & Audet, supra note 44, at 1109.
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•
•
•

Payer and/or manufacturer reporting
Proactive patient outreach for prescription refill and renewal
Prior authorization assistance 46

Many of these services can be Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies (REMS) that the FDA requires for drugs that raise special
safety concerns. 47 While the FDA imposes the requirements on
manufacturers, 48 specialty pharmacies can manage and perform the
necessary steps of REMS programs for pharmaceutical companies. 49
PBMs’ own utilization reviews may also demonstrate the need for such
services in order to improve patient compliance with drug protocols. 50
Some patients, however, complain about “onerous refill
policies that require hours on the phone, shipments that are delayed or
error-ridden, and difficulty reaching a pharmacist or other
representatives.” 51 At times phone calls that are purportedly meant to
counsel patients, in reality are designed to pressure them to order
refills. 52 In addition, the cost of hiring personnel to provide training and
other services to patients is presumably included in the cost of specialty
pharmacy drugs even for patients who are simply swallowing a pill and
need no special assistance. 53
C. The Cost of Specialty Drugs
In 2004, nineteen percent of Americans’ drug spending was
attributable to specialty drugs, but the figure rose to thirty-three percent
in 2015 and forty-one percent in 2018, and it is expected to reach fifty
46

Hagerman et al., supra note 25.
U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies |
REMS, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/risk-evaluation-andmitigation-strategies-rems (last updated Aug. 8, 2019).
48
Id.
49
PHARMACEUTICAL CARE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, PBM SPECIALTY
PHARMACIES IMPROVE PATIENT OUTCOMES AND REDUCE COSTS 5 (2017),
https://www.pcmanet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/PBM-Specialty-PharmaciesImprove-Patient-Outcomes-and-Reduced-Costs_whitepaper_final.pdf.
50
Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy, Drug Utilization Review, July 18, 2019,
https://www.amcp.org/about/managed-care-pharmacy-101/concepts-managed-carepharmacy/drug-utilization-review (“Drug utilization review (DUR) is defined as an
authorized, structured, ongoing review of prescribing, dispensing and use of
medication.”).
51
Thomas & Pollack, supra note 37.
52
Gary F., Giampetruzzi & Jonathan Stevens, A Special Type of Government
Scrutiny: Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Relationships with Specialty Pharmacies:
Part I, 15 PHARM. L. & INDUSTRY REP. 13, Mar. 31, 2017, available at
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=ce3fec69-2334-6428811c-ff00004cbded.
53
See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
47
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percent by 2020 to 2025. 54 Americans spent $150 billion on specialty
drugs in 2015. 55 Furthermore, prices for commonly used brand-name
specialty drugs rose by fifty-seven percent between 2014 and 2018. 56
Medicare Part D is a public insurance program that provides
seniors with prescription drug coverage. 57 Its average annual spending
on specialty drugs per beneficiary increased from $11,330 in 2010 to
$33,460 in 2015. 58 Medicare Part D’s net spending for specialty drugs
almost quadrupled, rising from $8.7 billion in 2010 to $32.8 billion in
2015. 59 By comparison, Medicare Part D’s total cost increase was far
less dramatic during this time period, rising from $62 billion in 2010 to
$90 billion in 2015. 60 For Medicaid, a public health insurance program
for low income Americans, 61 the spending figure in 2015 was $9.9
billion, roughly double its payments for specialty drugs in 2010. 62
In response to the high cost of specialty drugs, some insurers
have created “specialty tiers” in which participants’ coinsurance

54

Chadi Nabhan, How Pharmacy Benefit Managers Add to Financial Toxicity The
Copay Accumulator Program, 4 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1665, 1665 (2018) (specialty
drugs are “now on pace to account for half of prescription drug spending by 2020”);
IQVIA, Medicine Use and Spending in the U.S.: A Review of 2017 and Outlook to
2022 (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.iqvia.com/institute/reports/medicine-use-andspending-in-the-us-review-of-2017-outlook-to-2022 (“The balance of medicine
spending has shifted strongly to specialty medicines from traditional treatments”);
Tharaldson, supra note 35 (spending on specialty drugs “is estimated to reach close
to 50% in the next two years”); Thomas & Pollack, supra note 37 (indicating that
spending on specialty drugs is “heading toward 50 percent in the next 10 years”).
55
National Pharmaceutical Services, supra note 25. See also Fein, supra note 38, at
28 (“Total prescription dispensing revenues from specialty drugs at retail, mail, longterm care, and specialty pharmacies reached $138 billion in 2017.”). But see
Menkhaus et al., supra note 32 (“In 2017, specialty medications accounted for 46.5%
($210 billion) of the total $453 billion drug spend in the United States.”).
56
Kamal et al., supra note 21 (noting that “prices for generic drugs dropped by 35%”
during the 2014-2018 period).
57
Patricia Barry, Part 1: How Medicare Part D Works, AARP,
https://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-11-2009/how_medicarepart_d_drug_coverage_works.html (updated Oct. 2016).
58
Anna Anderson-Cook, Prices for and Spending on Specialty Drugs in Medicare
Part D and Medicaid: An In-Depth Analysis, p. 4, (March 2019) (Congressional
Budget
Office
working
paper
2019-02),
available
at
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-03/55011-Specialty_Drugs_WP.pdf.
59
Id. at 3.
60
Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, The Facts on Medicare Spending and
Financing, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 2, June 22, 2018,
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Facts-on-Medicaid-Spending-andFinancing.
61
Robin Rudowitz et al., 10 Things to Know about Medicaid: Setting the Facts
Straight, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, March 6, 2019,
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/10-things-to-know-about-medicaidsetting-the-facts-straight/.
62
Anderson-Cook, supra note 58, at 4.
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payments 63 can reach as high as twenty-five to thirty-three percent of
the drug’s price. 64 By contrast, under one Medicare plan, patients pay
only one to three dollars for preferred generic drugs, seven to eleven
dollars for non-preferred generic drugs, and thirty-eight to forty-two
dollars for preferred brand name drugs. 65 Thus, specialty drugs can
generate prohibitive out-of-pocket costs for enrollees. 66 According to
the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, in 2019, median annual outof-pocket costs for the specialty-tier drugs it examined under Medicare
Part D ranged from $2,622 (for the hepatitis C drug Zepatier) to
$16,551 (for the leukemia drug Idhifa). 67 In 2013, only 2.3% of
prescriptions were for specialty drugs, but 29.9% of patients’ out-ofpocket costs were attributable to these drugs. 68

63

Coinsurance is the “percentage of costs of a covered health care service you pay
(20%, for example) after you've paid your deductible.”
HealthCare.gov,
Coinsurance, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/co-insurance/ (accessed May 22,
2019).
64
G. Caleb Alexander et al., Reducing Branded Prescription Drug Prices: A Review
of Policy Options, 37 PHARMACOTHERAPY 1469, 1470 (2017); Joseph J. HylakReinholtz, & Jay R. Naftzger, Is It Time to Shed a “Tier” for Four-Tier Prescription
Drug Formularies? Specialty Drug Tiers May Violate HIPAA’s Anti-Discrimination
Provisions and Statutory Goals, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (2011); Patel &
Audet, supra note 44, at 1107-08; Blue Cross Blue Shield Blue Care Network of
Michigan,
How
Do
Drug
Tiers
Work,
https://www.bcbsm.com/medicare/help/understanding-plans/pharmacy-prescriptiondrugs/tiers.html (last updated Aug. 9, 2018) (explaining that under most plans,
enrollees pay “25% to 33% of the retail cost for drugs” in the specialty tier”).
For further information about specialty tiers, see Cubanski et al., supra note 24 at
161-62:
-

Ninety-eight percent of covered workers at large firms have
coverage for specialty drugs…. Among these workers, 52%
are in a plan with at least one cost-sharing tier just for specialty
drugs….

-

Among covered workers in a plan with a separate tier for
specialty drugs, 34% have a copayment for specialty drugs and
59% have coinsurance…. The average copayment is $99 and
the average coinsurance rate is 26%.... Eighty-one percent of
those with coinsurance have a maximum dollar limit on the
amount of coinsurance they must pay.

65

Blue Cross Blue Shield Blue Care Network of Michigan, supra note 64.
Cubanski et al., supra note 24.
67
Id. (basing conclusions on 28 drugs that were studied).
68
Rebekah L. Hanson, Specialty Pharmacy and the Medication Access Dilemma, 72
AM. J. HEALTH-SYST. PHARM. 695, 695 (2015).
66
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By way of background, note that retail prices (also called list
prices) are not equivalent to what most patients pay for drugs. 69
Individuals with insurance coverage pay a share of the price, which is
either a fixed dollar amount (a co-pay) 70 or a percentage of the drug’s
cost (co-insurance). 71 The patient’s payment is her out-of-pocket cost. 72
Moreover, PBMs negotiate with drug manufacturers for large discounts
so that insurers pay far less than the retail prices for the drugs they
cover. 73
Out-of-pocket costs for specialty drugs that are not covered by
insurance can be astronomical for patients. The Kaiser study focused
on fourteen drugs that are excluded from some or all Medicare Part D
plans 74 and found that in 2019, patients’ median annual expenditures
for them would fall between $26,209 (for Zepatier) to $145,769 (for
the targeted therapy cancer drug Gleevec). 75 A 2019 article in Health
Affairs listed the annual retail prices of thirteen specialty drugs, which
ranged from $35,000 to $750,000 for the first year followed by

69

David Lazarus, She Paid $3.47 for a Prescription Drug. The Retail Price Was
Aug.
18,
2018,
10,000%
Higher,
L.A.
TIMES,
https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-fantasyland-drug-pricing20180828-story.html.
70
Blue Cross Blue Shield Blue Care Network of Michigan, How Do Deductibles,
Coinsurance and Copays Work?, https://www.bcbsm.com/index/health-insurancehelp/faqs/topics/how-health-insurance-works/deductibles-coinsurance-copays.html
(accessed July 19, 2019).
71
Id.; Harris Meyer, Why Prescription Drug List Prices Matter, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Mar. 2, 2019, https://www.modernhealthcare.com/technology/whyprescription-drug-list-prices-matter.
72
HealthCare.gov, Out-of-Pocket Costs, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/out-ofpocket-costs/ (accessed July 19, 2019).
73
Lazarus, supra note 69; Jessica Wapner, How Prescription Drugs Get Their Prices,
Mar.
17,
2017,
Explained,
NEWSWEEK,
https://www.newsweek.com/2017/04/14/prescription-drug-pricing-569444.html.
74
Cubanski et al., supra note 24, at 2 (explaining that “[n]ot all specialty tier drugs
are covered by all Medicare Part D plans, unless they are in one of the six protected
classes”). Medicare Part D must cover “all or substantially all” drugs in the following
six categories:
“immunosuppressants, antidepressants, antipsychotics,
anticonvulsants, antiretrovirals, and antineoplastics.” These drugs are used to treat
HIV, cancer, epilepsy, and other serious conditions. Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, An Overview of the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Benefit, Oct.
2018 Fact Sheet, p. 4, http://files.kff.org/attachment/Fact-Sheet-An-Overview-ofthe-Medicare-Part-D-Prescription-Drug-Benefit; Tom Wilbur, Changes to the Six
Protected Class Policy Are the Wrong Prescription for Medicare and HIV Patients,
THE CATALYST, Mar. 15, 2019, https://catalyst.phrma.org/changes-to-the-sixprotected-class-policy-the-wrong-prescription-for-medicare-and-hiv-patients.
75
Id.; Chemocare, Gleevec TM, http://chemocare.com/chemotherapy/druginfo/gleevec.aspx (accessed Apr. 24, 2019).
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$375,000 for subsequent years. 76 The cost of ten of the thirteen
medications exceeded $100,000 annually. 77
Some manufacturers offer coupon or discount programs to help
patients pay their out-of-pocket costs. 78 These programs, however, may
be limited in scope and be discontinued once the patient is committed
to the drug. 79
II.

PATIENT CONCERNS AND LEGAL QUESTIONS

Specialty drugs and pharmacies raise a number of legal and
ethical concerns. They are rooted in several startling regulatory gaps.
This part analyzes the following questions:
1) How do medications receive the designation of specialty drug?
2) How do manufacturers determine drug prices?
3) What choice limitations do PBMs impose on specialty drug
consumers and do these constraints generate conflicts of interest?
4) Are actions by PBMs, manufacturers, and specialty pharmacies
indicative of anticompetitive behavior under the antitrust laws?
A. Specialty Drug Designation
There appear to be no rules or regulations that determine which
medications can and cannot be designated as specialty drugs. The
determination is made by PBMs, which also decide whether the drug
must be purchased from a specialty pharmacy. 80
Different private and public insurance plans have different
drugs in their specialty tiers. 81 For example, the 2019 specialty drug

76
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, When Is the Price of a Drug Unjust? The Average Lifetime
Earnings Standard, 38 HEALTH AFFS. 604, 605 (2019).
77
Id.
78
Lotvin, supra note 22, at 1741.
79
Id.; Debra Shute, Understand Pharma Discount Coupons, 95 MED. ECON., Oct. 3,
2018,
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/article/understand-pharma-discountcoupons.
80
Darrel Rowland, Specialty Drugs: The New Arena for Pharmacy Benefit Manager
DISPATCH,
Apr.
24,
2019,
available
at
Profits?,
COLUMBUS
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190423/specialty-drugs-new-arena-forpharmacy-benefit-manager-profits; Applied Policy, supra note 8, at 9 (noting that
concerns have “been raised with how PBMs categorize particular drugs as ‘specialty’
drugs”).
81
See Medicare.gov, What Drug Plans Cover, https://www.medicare.gov/drugcoverage-part-d/what-drug-plans-cover (accessed July 19, 2019) (“Plans can vary the
list of prescription drugs they cover (called a formulary) and how they place drugs
into different "tiers" on their formularies.”).
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list for Aetna’s Premier Plan includes 467 medications. 82 By contrast,
BlueCross BlueShield of North Carolina lists 604 specialty
medications in 2019. 83 A comparison of an Express Scripts Medicare
2019 Formulary Value Plan (“Express Scripts Formulary”) 84 and a
Basic Blue® Rx Value (PDP) 2019 Formulary (“Basic Blue
Formulary”) 85 further highlights the differences that can exist among
drug formularies, which are insurance plans’ lists of the drugs that they
cover. 86 Eighty-three medications listed as Tier 5 (specialty drugs) on
the Basic Blue Formulary were listed as lower tier (non-specialty
drugs) on the Express Scripts Formulary. In addition, there were over
one-hundred specialty drugs offered on one of the two plans that were
not offered at all on the other formulary.
PBMs may be financially motivated to classify medications as
specialty drugs. Recall that PBMs own the industry’s largest specialty
pharmacies. 87 Once a medication is designated as a specialty drug, the
PBM can instruct patients to purchase it from its own specialty
pharmacy and thus profit considerably from sales. 88
Some specialty drugs require complex handling or
administration, 89 but some do not. 90 For example, the 2019 Basic Blue®
Value formulary listed Asacol HD, a drug that treats ulcerative colitis,

82

Aetna, Specialty Drug Coverage, http://www.aetna.com/individuals-familieshealth-insurance/document-library/pharmacy/2019-specialty-drug-list-premier.pdf
(accessed July 5, 2019).
83
BlueCross
BlueShield
of
North
Carolina,
https://www.bluecrossnc.com/sites/default/files/document/attachment/services/publi
c/pdfs/formulary/specialty-network/specialty-drug-list.pdf (accessed May 24, 2019).
84
Express Scripts, Express Scripts Medicare (PDP) 2019 Formulary (List of Covered
Drugs), https://www.express-scriptsmedicare.com/pdf/medicare/medicare-part-d2019-formulary-value.pdf (last updated May 24, 2019).
85
Basic Blue® Rx (PDP), Basic Blue® Rx Value (PDP) 2019 Formulary,
https://www.basicbluerx.com/sites/default/files/2019_BBRx_formulary_Value508.pdf (last updated June 1, 2019).
86
Medicare.gov, supra note 81.
87
See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
88
See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; Darrel Rowland, Questions Raised
on How Pharmacy Benefit Managers Profit from Specialty Drugs, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH,
Apr.
24,
2019,
available
at
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190424/questions-raised-on-how-pharmacybenefit-managers-profit-from-specialty-drugs. See infra Part II.C for further
discussion of patient choice limitations and associated conflicts of interest and Part
II.D for antitrust concerns.
89
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
90
Maryann Dowd, Valued Services from Specialty Pharmacy: A Manufacturers
PHARMACY
TIMES,
Oct.
21,
2014,
Perspective,
SPECIALTY
https://www.specialtypharmacytimes.com/publications/specialty-pharmacytimes/2014/october-2014/valued-services-from-specialty-pharmacy-amanufacturers-perspective/p-2 (stating that “each product that falls into the specialty
pharmacy category demands its own set of unique services.”).
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as a specialty drug. 91 This medication is merely a pill that patients
swallow. 92 The same is true for the Parkinson’s disease drug Gocovri,
discussed in the Introduction 93 and a drug called Ingrezza for adults
with tardive dyskinesia. 94 Other medications come with simple
instructions that ordinary retail pharmacies can provide to patients
along with easy-to-follow literature. For example, a drug called
Perforomist, used by patients with chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD), is a specialty drug on the 2019 Basic Blue® Value
formulary. 95 This drug is inhaled orally twice a day, using a standard
jet nebulizer. 96 Unlike Basic Blue, the Express Scripts Medicare (PDP)
2019 Formulary lists Asacol HD and Perforomist as tier three drugs. 97
This means that rather than specialty drugs, they are preferred brandname drugs with “lower copayments than non-preferred drugs.” 98 For
patients, having a drug designated as a specialty medication can be
quite punishing because of very high specialty tier coinsurance
payments and pharmacy choice restrictions. 99 One wonders if there is
any justification for designating certain drugs as specialty medications
other than the PBMs’ own profit motives. 100
Several states have adopted statutory definitions of “specialty
drugs.” Some statutory provisions focus on the medication’s price.
Connecticut, for example, defines specialty drugs as those that exceed
Medicare’s specialty tier cost threshold. 101 In other states, the

91

Basic Blue® Rx (PDP), supra note 85, at 46 (listing the item as a tier-5 drug, which
indicates specialty status).
92
U.S. National Library of Medicine, Label: ASACOL HD- Mesalamine Tablet,
Delayed
Release,
DAILYMED,
https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?setid=2f68f68c-58d2-4575b573-f2e62f95d7e3&audience=consumer (last accessed June 30, 2019).
93
See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
94
Aetna, supra note 82 (listing Ingrezza as a specialty drug); U.S. National Library
of
Medicine,
Label:
IngrezzaValbenazine
Capsule,
DAILYMED,
https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?setid=4c970164-cafb-421f9eb5-c226ef0a3417&audience=consumer (accessed July 5, 2019).
95
Basic Blue® Rx (PDP), supra note 85, at 57 (listing the item as a tier-5 drug, which
indicates specialty status).
96
U.S. National Library of Medicine, Label: Perforomist - Formoterol Fumarate
Dihydrate
Solution,
DAILYMED,
https://dailymed.nlm.nih.gov/dailymed/drugInfo.cfm?setid=fb2fe258-fe2e-47f68adf-ca75bf6f90af&audience=consumer (last accessed June 30, 2019).
97
Express Scripts, supra note 84, at 60, 76.
98
Id. at vii.
99
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
100
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
101
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-479ooo(12) (2020). See also, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY § 1367.243(c) (2018).

15
DRAFT: Please Do Not Cite
Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3470244

SPECIALTY DRUGS AND THE HEALTH CARE COST CRISIS

designation requires special handling or administration of the drugs. 102
Thus, Michigan’s statute provides:
(i) “Specialty prescription drug” means a prescription
drug used to treat a rare, complex, or chronic medical
condition that meets any of the following requirements:
(i) Requires special administration including, but
not limited to, inhalation or infusion.
(ii) Requires special delivery or special storage.
(iii) Requires special oversight, intensive
monitoring, or care coordination with a person
licensed under article 15 of the public health code,
1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838. 103
The statutes that define “specialty drugs” address various prescription
drug reporting requirements, coverage guidelines, and, in some cases,
copayment or coinsurance limitations, as discussed below. 104
It is important to understand that state legislation regarding
health insurance generally has limited reach because a large portion of
insurance policies are not subject to statutory compliance. 105 The
“deemer clause” in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) establishes that state laws regulating insurance are
preempted with respect to self-funded health insurance plans. 106
Employers with self-funded plans collect premiums and pay all medical
claims themselves, though they may use a third party to do
administrative work for the plan. 107 According to the Henry J. Kaiser
Family Foundation, in 2018, sixty-one percent of workers were
enrolled in fully or partially self-funded health plans, which are
particularly popular among large companies. 108 The ERISA exemption
significantly diminishes the efficacy of state laws such as those
defining “specialty drugs” for insurance purposes.
102

See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE ANN. §14105.45(13) (2017); D.C. CODE ANN. §
48-855.01(10) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 18 § 3364(7) (2014); MD. INS. CODE ANN.
§15-847(5) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 19-02.1-16.2 (2017).
103
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 124.73(i) (2019).
104
See supra notes 101-103 and infra 127-130 and accompanying text.
105
See Sharona Hoffman, Step Therapy: Legal, Ethical, and Policy Implications of a
Cost-Cutting Measure, 73 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 38, 55-56 (2018).
106
Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(B) (2010). See infra Part III.B.1 for further details
regarding ERISA.
107
Healthcare.gov,
Self-Insured
Plan,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/self-insured-plan/ (last visited June 17,
2019).
108
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2018
ANNUAL SURVEY 12 (Oct. 2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/ReportEmployer-Health-Benefits-Annual-Survey-2018.
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B. Specialty Drug Prices
American manufacturers are free to price their drugs as they see
fit without constraint. 109 Two experts describe the United States pricing
system as follows:
Under the current US system, drug manufacturers
estimate what the market will bear for a novel therapy.
Then, if there is concern about negative publicity about
drug prices, a fraction of the cost may be subtracted, at
least while attention persists. Absent competition or
negotiation, this fraction is determined by the
company’s internal moral compass and the degree of
awareness in the biomedical ecosystem, which is often
driven by public perception of the specific disease. 110
Drug prices are generally inflated in the United States, 111 but the
problem is acute for specialty drugs.
Drug companies often justify their prices by citing their
research and development costs. 112 However, many experts accuse the
drug industry of grossly exaggerating its expenditures. 113 For example,
one study concluded that the cost of developing a cancer drug is $648
million rather than the $2.7 billion that manufacturers claim. 114
Even after drugs become established in the marketplace,
manufacturers often increase their prices. 115 These increases generally
109

Franklin Liu, The Daraprim and the Pharmaceutical Pricing Paradox A Broken
System?, 2015 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1, 14 (2015) (asserting that
“pharmaceutical companies can exploit the life-saving nature of their products and
capitalize on a vulnerable segment of the population by demanding unconscionably
high prices for their products”).
110
Robert M. Califf & Andrew Slavitt, Lowering Cost and Increasing Access to
Drugs without Jeopardizing Innovation, 321 JAMA 1571, 1571 (2019).
111
Robert Langreth, Drug Prices, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 5, 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/drug-prices.
112
Brittany Humphries & Feng Xie, Canada’s Amendment to Patented Drug Price
Regulation: A Prescription for Global Drug Cost Control?, 32 JAMA 1565, 1566
(2019).
113
Id.; Ezekiel L. Emanuel, Big Pharma’s Go-To Defense of Soaring Drug Prices
Doesn’t Add Up: Just How Expensive Do Prescription Drugs Need to be to Fund
Innovative Research?, THE ATLANTIC, March 23, 2019, available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/03/drug-prices-high-cost-researchand-development/585253/.
114
Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to Bring
a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA INTERN.
MED. 1569, 1569 (2017).
115
Id.; Stacie B. Dusertzina & Peter B. Bach, Prescription Drugs – List Price, Net
Price, and the Rebate Caught in the Middle, 321 JAMA 1563, 1563 (2019) (“In recent
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are not justified by any showing that the drug is more effective or
beneficial than expected. 116 In some cases, price increases are
egregious. An infamous example is Martin Shkreli’s decision to raise
the price of Daraprim by 5000 percent, from $13.50 to $750 per pill in
2015. 117
Drug prices in the United States are notoriously higher than in
other countries. As just one illustration, the antiretroviral drug
dolutegravir costs twenty-seven dollars per year in the country of
Georgia and $20,130 per year in the United States. 118 Other nations
have proactively tackled the challenge of affordable drug pricing. In
1987, for example, Canada established a Patented Medicine Prices
Review Board to control patented drug prices. 119 The Board conducts
scientific reviews, which include comparisons of prices in seven other
countries in order to establish a maximum list price for each drug. 120
By contrast, in the United States, Medicare is not permitted to
negotiate drug prices directly with pharmaceutical manufacturers, let
alone to take regulatory steps to control them. 121 A few states have
undertaken limited cost-containment initiatives, but the federal
government has failed thus far to launch successful efforts. 122
One stalled federal proposal specifically targeted specialty
drugs. In June of 2017, Representatives David McKinley (R-WV) and
G.K. Butterfield (D-NC) introduced the Patients' Access to Treatment
Act in the 115th Congress. 123 The bill would disallow large percentage

years, pharmaceutical manufacturers have consistently increased the list prices of
their products.”).
116
Califf & Slavitt, supra note 110, at 1571.
117
Michael A. Carrier et al., Using Antitrust Law to Challenge Turing’s Daraprim
Price Increase, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1379 (2016). Daraprim is used to
treat Toxoplasmosis, a serious infection caused by a parasite. Daraprim,
https://www.daraprimdirect.com/ (accessed May 27, 2019).
118
Joel Sim & Andrew Hill, Is Pricing of Dolutegravir Equitable? A Comparative
Analysis of Price and Country Income Level in 52 Countries, 4 J. VIRUS
ERADICATION 230, 231 (2018).
119
Humphries & Xie, supra note 112, at 1565.
120
Id. The seven countries are Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and the United States. Given high pharmaceutical costs in Canada, some
have questioned the Board’s efficacy in recent years, and the government is
considering regulatory changes. Id.
121
Dusertzina & Bach, supra note 115, at 1563.
122
Jane C. Horvath & Gerard F. Anderson, The States as Important Laboratories for
Federal Prescription Drug Cost-Containment Efforts, 321 JAMA 1561, 1561 (2019)
(reporting on several state efforts, including Maryland’s enacting “legislation that
would prevent ‘unconscionable’ price increases for off-patent drugs that have fewer
than 3 competitors”).
123
H.R. 2999, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017); American Society of Hematology, 2018
ASH Advocacy Efforts to Ensure Patient Access to Care, Dec. 10, 2018,
https://www.hematology.org/Advocacy/Policy-News/2018/9253.aspx.
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coinsurance charges for specialty tier drugs. 124 It would permit only
fixed co-pays that are consistent with those that apply to the lowest cost
nonpreferred brand name drug tier. 125 The bill did not become law, but
advocates hope that legislators will reintroduce it in the 116th
Congress. 126
A number of states have been more successful in tackling costsharing for specialty tier drugs. California places a limit of $250 or
$500 of cost sharing for a thirty-day supply, depending on the type of
drug. 127 Delaware, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, and Maryland
limit patients’ out-of-pocket costs to $150 for a thirty-day supply. 128
New York disallows cost sharing that exceeds the amount applicable to
non-preferred brand name drugs, thereby effectively eliminating
specialty tiers. 129 Recall, however, that state regulations restricting
health insurance practices do not govern self-funded plans, which now
cover the majority of individuals with employer-provided benefits. 130
By definition, specialty drugs are among the most expensive
drugs on the market. 131 The dearth of price control mechanisms in the
United States disproportionately affects the sickest patients who often
need these drugs and must pay exorbitant amounts for them. 132 In fact,
there is nothing to prevent a manufacturer from deliberately assigning
a very high price to a drug in order to have the specialty drug label
bestowed upon it. This classification, in turn, confirms that it should
have an astronomical price tag because that is the nature of specialty
medications.
C. Conflict of Interest and Patient Choice
Consumers often have little choice as to who will fill their
specialty drug prescriptions. 133 PBMs frequently require patients to
purchase specialty drugs from the specialty pharmacies that they
own. 134 Many experts assert that this requirement creates a conflict of

124

See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
Congress.Gov, H.R.2999 - Patients' Access to Treatments Act of 2017,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2999 (accessed May 27,
2019); American Society of Hematology, supra note 123.
126
American Society of Hematology, supra note 123.
127
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1342.73(a) (2019).
128
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 3364(b) (2014); D.C. CODE ANN. §48-855.02 (2017);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1060.5(A) (2015); MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 15-847(c)(1) (2014).
129
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221(a)(16) (2019); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §4406-c(7) (2019).
130
See supra, notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
131
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
132
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
133
Fein, supra note 38, at 29; Thomas & Pollack, supra note 37.
134
Bourne & Ahrens, supra note 41, at 50 (“Critics have suggested that PBMs
improperly prevent other pharmacies from dispensing specialty drugs and force
125
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interest. 135 While PBMs purportedly exist in order to save health plans
money, 136 their zeal for cost-savings may be tempered by the prospect
of large profits for their specialty pharmacies. 137 The National
Community Pharmacists Association powerfully describes the
concerns about PBM activities in this area:
When PBMs own mail order or specialty pharmacies,
PBMs utilize such road blocks to steer patients to their
proprietary pharmacies. Specifically, in the specialty
pharmacy space, PBMs arbitrarily define high-cost
drugs as “specialty drugs” and encourage or require that
beneficiaries fill these prescriptions at PBM-owned or
affiliated specialty pharmacies. Forcing patients,
particularly those on specialty drugs for complex
conditions, to get their prescriptions from a pharmacy
with which it has no personal relationship severely
limits patients’ choice and may impact the quality of
care and adherence. 138
In addition, many specialty pharmacies supply drugs only
through mail order. 139 This delivery mechanism can deprive patients of
control over the timing of their refills and provoke anxiety. Patients
may worry that their drugs will be stolen or exposed to extreme weather
if they arrive when no one is home. 140 Indeed, some patients may feel
compelled to plan vacations or business trips around their anticipated
drug delivery dates.

patients to use the PBMs' own specialty pharmacy services.”); Rowland, supra note
80.
135
Cathy Candisky, Ohio Medicaid Officials to Crack Down on PBM Specialty Drug
DISPATCH,
Apr.
30,
2019,
Practice,
COLUMBUS
https://gatehousenews.com/sideeffects/ohio-medicaid-officials-crack-pbmspecialty-drug-practice/site/dispatch.com/; Thomas & Pollack, supra note 37.
136
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
137
Applied Policy, supra note 8, at 8; Thomas & Pollack, supra note 37.
138
See Letter, Comments to the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) 21st Century
Hearings, Constitution Center September 21st Hearings Session (Docket ID: FTC2018-0076), From National Community Pharmacists Association Vice President of
Pharmacy Policy and Regulatory Affairs, Ronna B. Hauser, Nov. 15, 2018, p. 3,
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/11/ftc-20180076-d-0018-162492.pdf (last accessed Jul. 20, 2019).
139
Applied Policy, supra note 8, at 9; Shye, supra note 36; Thomas & Pollack, supra
note 37.
140
Olga Khazan, Invisible Middlemen Are Slowing Down American Health Care, THE
ATLANTIC,
Apr.
9,
2019,
available
at
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/04/pbms-health-care-drug-delaysprices/586711/.
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Patients vary as to how they prefer to fill their prescriptions. In
one study, fifty-four percent of respondents preferred to pick up their
prescriptions at a retail pharmacy, while more than forty percent
favored home delivery. 141 In another study, there was approximately
an equal split between preferences. 142 A particularly important finding
is that choice matters. Enabling patients to choose how they fill their
prescriptions can improve adherence to medication protocols. 143
Patients who do not pick up their drugs in person lose the
opportunity to have face-to-face conversations with pharmacists
regarding their instructions and concerns, and such conversations can
enhance patient compliance with drug protocols. 144 Specialty drug
mail-order consumers can receive personal attention from specialty
pharmacy staff, 145 but these discussions occur through separate phone
calls rather than at the point of delivery.
Some legislators and regulators have already recognized the
importance of patient choice. At the federal level, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prohibits Medicare plans from
requiring enrollees to use mail-order pharmacies. 146
Many states have taken action as well. For example,
Mississippi provides that insurance plans may not prohibit enrollees
from selecting a participating pharmacist of their choice, and thus,
presumably, PBMs cannot require covered individuals to purchase
specialty drugs only from their own specialty pharmacies. 147
Furthermore, under Mississippi law, PBMs may not require enrollees
to obtain medications exclusively through mail-order or impose higher
costs or restrictions (such as quantity limitations) on patients who do
not opt for mail-order delivery. 148 Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia,
141

Janice M. Moore et al., The Adherence Impact of a Program Offering Specialty
Pharmacy Services to Patients Using Retail Pharmacies, 56 J. AM. PHARMACIST
ASS’N 47, 52 (2016).
142
Joshua N. Liberman et al., Revealed Preference for Community and Mail Service
Pharmacy, 51 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N 50, 55 (2011) (“Among those who initiated
therapy under the new benefit design [that enhanced patient choice], nearly equal
proportions elected mail service and community pharmacy channels, while among
those who previously used community pharmacy, nearly 79% elected community
pharmacy if they had not recently used mail service pharmacy.”).
143
Id. at 51; Moore et al., supra note 141, at 52-53.
144
Applied Policy, supra note 8, at 8.
145
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
146
CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, YOUR GUIDE TO MEDICARE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE 24 (revised June 2018), available at
https://www.medicare.gov/pubs/pdf/11109-Your-Guide-to-Medicare-PrescripDrug-Cov.pdf.
147
MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-9-6(3)(a) (2013).
148
Id. at § 83-9-6(3)(f)-(g).
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have likewise adopted pharmacy choice statutes, though not all are as
comprehensive as Mississippi’s. 149
All of these legal interventions, however, are limited in scope.
The federal rule covers only Medicare Part D enrollees. 150 As
previously discussed, state legislation regarding health insurance
applies only to plans that are not self-funded employer-sponsored
plans. 151 Therefore, despite the states’ best intentions, many of their
residents will not benefit from their patient choice mandates.
D. Antitrust: Tying Arrangements
The activities of manufacturers, specialty pharmacies, and
PBMs raise antitrust concerns because these entities may bundle goods
or services in ways that foreclose competition. 152 Unlawful bundling is
called “tying,” which is defined as “an agreement under which the
seller agrees to sell a product to a buyer, but only on the condition that
the buyer also purchases a different product from the seller,” 153 or “at
least agrees that [it] will not purchase that product from any other
supplier.” 154
Tying arrangements constitute a combination that forecloses
trade or commerce in violation of Sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act. 155
The Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination … or conspiracy in
restraint of trade." 156 Based on contemporary Supreme Court cases,
scholars have articulated a four-part test for an unlawful tying
arrangement: (1) separate products must be tied and sold together, (2)
the seller holds “appreciable” economic power over the tying product,
(3) the seller coerces the buyer by “afford[ing] consumers no choice
149

ALA. CODE § 27-45-3 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 7303 (1995); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 431R-3(b) (2013); IDAHO CODE § 41-1844(1) (1991); IOWA CODE § 514C.5
(1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1964(15)(a)(i) (2014); MD CODE ANN., INS. § 15806 (1997); N.J. REV. STAT. § 17:48-6j (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-51-37(c)
(2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-12.2(1) (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 764l
(2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-18-37 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §56-7-2359
(a) and (e) (2016); W. VA. CODE, § 33-24-7h (2003).
150
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
151
See supra, notes 105-108 and accompanying text.
152
See United States of America v. CVS Health Corp., Civ. Case No. 1:18-cv02340-RJL, Brief of Amicus Curiae by AIDS Healthcare Fourndation (D.D.C. Feb.
5, 2019) (“a post-merger CVS, with the inclusion of Aetna’s 22 million lives, will
have the leverage and incentive to use increasingly aggressive tactics to narrow its
networks to exclude small and specialty pharmacies”).
153
Uri Benoliel, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts,
41 RUTGERS U. L.J. 527, 527 (2010). See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-14 (1984).
154
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
155
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (2010).
156
Id. at § 1.
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but to purchase the tied product from it,” and (4) the arrangement
impacts a “substantial volume” of commerce in the tied market. 157
Bundled ties involve connected purchases that occur when a
business sells multiple separate products together, often relying on its
monopoly power in one market to influence another. 158 Alleged
bundling ties often hinge on whether the products are separate (which
would violate the antitrust laws) or single products (which would
not). 159
The key for bundled tying is whether the business is preventing
goods “from competing directly for consumer choice on their merits,
i.e., being selected as a result of ‘buyers’ independent judgment.’”160
Further, “[w]ith a tie, a buyer’s ‘freedom to select the best bargain in
the second market [could be] impaired by his need to purchase the tying
product, and perhaps by an inability to evaluate the true cost of either
product.’” 161 Finally, “[d]irect competition on the merits of the tied
product is foreclosed when the tying product either is sold only in a
bundle with the tied product or, though offered separately, is sold at a
bundled price, so that the buyer pays the same price whether he takes
the tied product or not.” 162
Several forms of tying may exist in the specialty drug space.
First, in some cases, manufacturers who are the sole producers of high
cost drugs (often deemed specialty drugs) bundle those drugs with
medications that their competitors likewise make. Thus, PBMs that
want to contract with a manufacturer for a drug that they cannot obtain
elsewhere, must also purchase the bundled drugs from that same
manufacturer. For example, in 2018, Sugartown Pediatrics sued Merck
& Co., for an alleged anticompetitive bundling scheme. 163 Merck is the
157

U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (2001). See Mark DeFeo, Unlocking the
IPhone: How Antitrust Law Can Save Consumers from the Inadequacies of Copyright
Law, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1037, 1059, nn. 166-69 (2008), relying on Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc. 504 U.S. 451 (1992), Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), Fortner Enters. Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969), U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); N. Pac. Ry. V.
U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1958), Int’l Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
158
See Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: Chapter 5, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, June 25, 2015, available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-undersection-2-sherman-act-chapter-5 (last accessed Jul. 20, 2019); Travis Clark, Google
v. Commissioner: A Comparison of European Union and United States Antitrust
Law, 47 SETON HALL L. Rev. 1021, 1026 (2016).
159
Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act: Chapter 5, supra note 158.
160
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 87 (2001), quoting Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13 (U.S. 1984) (abrogated on other grounds).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Sugartown Pediatrics LLC v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 18-1734 (E. D. PA, filed
Apr. 25, 2018).
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only United States manufacturer of several pediatric vaccines, such as
the measles, mumps, rubella vaccine. 164 Sugartown alleged that when
GlaxoSmithKline was about to introduce a rotavirus vaccine that would
compete with Merck’s, “Merck added a condition to its contracts that
required customers to buy all or nearly all of their pediatric rotavirus
vaccines from Merck or face substantial price penalties on all other
Merck vaccines.” 165
Second, specialty pharmacies provide educational, monitoring,
and other services along with the drugs they sell. 166 Patients receive
these services from specialty pharmacies whether they want them or
not, even if they are simply swallowing pills and do not need extensive
oversight. 167 Our research revealed no clear data about specialty
pharmacy services’ costs or charges. Thus, these costs are subject to
the same lack of transparency that characterizes so much in the
specialty drug arena. However, it stands to reason that there are
expenses associated with these services, such as hiring staff, and that
these costs are incorporated into the price of specialty drugs. Because
specialty pharmacies do not allow patients and payers to choose
whether to obtain particular services, they may be engaging in unlawful
bundling. 168
Third, PBMs may bundle their PBM services with services
from their wholly-owned specialty pharmacies. 169 When employers
contract with PBMs for their services, they may agree to a requirement
that beneficiatiaries use the the PBM’s specialty pharmacy. 170 In such
a case, the court is likely to find no antitrust violation. 171 However, if
PBMs compel use of their specialty pharmacies without addressing the
requirement in their services contract, they could be engaging in
anticompetitive conduct. Nevertheless, a further hurdle to a successful
164

Id. at ¶ 3.
Id. at ¶ 4.
166
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
167
See supra notes __ and accompanying text (p. 14).
168
Federal Trade Commission, Tying the Sale of Two Products,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/singlefirm-conduct/tying-sale-two-products (accessed Oct. 5, 2019) (“The FTC
challenged a drug maker that required patients to purchase its blood-monitoring
services along with its medicine to treat schizophrenia.”).
169
See supra Part II.C. This has been raised as a concern related to the proposed
CVS-Aetna merger. See Letter, Competitive and Consumer Concerns Raised by the
CVS-Aetna Merger, From Diana L. Moss, President, American Antitrust Institute,
Mar. 26, 2018, at 7 (on file with authors) (“For example, CVS-Caremwark could …
offer pharmacy networks that do not provide important options (e.g., independent
specialty pharmacies) or force rival insurers into CVS-Caremark mail order pharmacy
services”).
170
Prime Aid Pharmacy Corp. v. Humana Inc., Case No. 16-2104, 2017 WL
3420933 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2017) at *2.
171
Id.
165
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antitrust claim is the fact that dissatisfied employers can change PBMs
once their contracts expire, and employees can often change insurance
plans every year during open season. 172 Therefore, consumers are not
“locked in” to the bundling arrangement in the long-run.
III.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerns about specialty drug designation, drug prices, lack of
patient choice, conflict of interest, anticompetitive behavior, and
services that lack medical necessity are all significant for patients and
their health care providers. These matters are ripe for regulatory and
legal interventions. The challenging questions are who should
undertake regulatory initiatives and how should they be achieved.
While the federal government sets standards for Medicare and
Medicaid coverage, it is unclear whether the federal government or the
states are in a better position to establish specialty drug rules for private
health plans. This Part offers recommendations for specialty drug
guidelines and analyzes pathways for such regulation in light of
ERISA’s exemption of self-funded health insurance plans. 173
A. Substantive Protections
Below we provide general principles that should guide
lawmakers in fashioning specialty drug rules. We leave the details to
the discretion of state or federal policy-makers, and outline only the
core of recommended remedial provisions.
1. Specialty Drug Designation
PBMs should not be entirely at liberty to determine which
medications are and are not specialty drugs. 174 Labeling a medication
as a specialty drug can have serious adverse consequences for patients.
Insurers’ specialty tiers often have very high coinsurance, 175 and
patients may face restrictions as to how and from whom they can obtain
the medications. 176 By contrast, PBMs have much to gain from such
designations since they can instruct patients to purchase specialty drugs
from their own specialty pharmacies. 177

172

Id. at 3.
See supra notes 105-108.
174
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
175
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
176
See supra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
177
See supra note 137.
173
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Statutory guidelines should establish boundaries for the
specialty drug designation. 178 Following the precedent set by several
states, such drugs should be characterized by special requirements for
their handling or administration rather than by their price. 179 The
services of specialty pharmacists may be beneficial when the patient
needs complex training or unusual delivery methods, but not when
ordinary retail pharmacies can easily fill the prescription and educate
patients about its use.
2. Specialty Drug Costs
Addressing the overwhelming problem of drug costs in the
United States is well beyond the scope of this Article. The robust
literature that already exists can fill many library shelves. 180 Legislators
are encouraged to continue to work diligently to harness American
medical costs.
A more modest effort that some states have successfully
undertaken is to limit patients’ out-of-pocket costs for high-priced
drugs (both specialty and non-specialty). All private and public health
plans should cap co-payments for specialty-tier drugs at a particular
dollar amount. Plans should be prohibited from charging coinsurance
based on a percentage of a drug’s price. 181
Another possible approach is a mandate that allows patients to
obtain just a few pills or doses for an initial trial period, such as a week
or two. 182 A patient who cannot tolerate the drug or finds it to be
ineffective would thus save the (possibly exorbitant) cost of a full
178

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) does not have a role in the specialty
drug designation of new drugs, and it cannot consider cost when approving new
drugs. However, it can impose Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS)
that limit uses and distribution of the specialty drug, and it can facilitate competition
by speeding follow-on biologics to market to help bring down costs. See Aaron S.
Kesselheim, Exisiting FDA Pathways Have Potential to Ensure Early Access To, And
Appropriate Use of, Specialty Drugs, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Oct. 2014, available at
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2014.0529.
179
See supra notes 101-103.
180
See e.g. ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, AND SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES (2019); ED SCHOONVELD,
THE PRICE OF GLOBAL HEALTH: DRUG PRICING STRATEGIES TO BALANCE PATIENT
ACCESS AND THE FUNDING OF INNOVATION (2017); Opinion Spotlight: Prescription
Drug Pricing, 321 JAMA (Apr. 23/30, 2019).
181
See supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
182
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MEDICARE
PAYMENT
POLICY
414
(March
2018),
available
at
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/defaultsource/reports/mar18_medpac_entirereport_sec.pdf (“They can also reduce waste by,
for example, initially dispensing a 7- or 14-day supply and observing the patient for
side effects, treatment effectiveness, and adherence before providing a 30-day
supply.”).
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thirty-day supply. In a 2019 senate hearing, Ohio’s Senator Portman
stated, “The bottom line is that a lot of drugs are being thrown away
because of the packaging and we should only be paying for the products
patients actually use.” 183
Some insurers already offer split-fill or partial fill programs for
specialty drugs. For example, BlueCross BlueShield of New Mexico
allows patients with new prescriptions for one of eight listed drugs to
obtain an initial sixteen-day supply to determine if they can tolerate the
medication. 184 ClearScript limits participants to a fifteen-day supply of
certain high cost specialty medications for the first six fills.185 The costsavings generated by general adoption of this approach would likely be
significant.
3. Conflict of Interest and Patient Choice
PBMs should not be permitted to dictate that patients must
purchase their drugs from their own specialty pharmacies and obtain
them only through mail order. 186 Such rules raise concerns about
conflict of interest and are likely designed to enrich PBMs. 187 They
also deprive patients of choice and autonomy and are vexing to
individuals who prefer face-to-face contact with pharmacists and more
control over the timing and delivery of their medications. 188
Nationally consistent rules should promote patient choice. All
patients should be able to choose between mail order and retail
pharmacies unless it is impossible for them to obtain a particular drug
from a local pharmacy. If PBMs wish to offer patients incentives for
opting for mail order delivery, those incentives should be modest and
capped at a particular amount. Moreover, patients who have access to
more than one pharmacy that can supply the drug should be able to
utilize whichever pharmacy they prefer.
4. Antitrust Enforcement

183

Sabrina Eaton, Senators Question Pharmaceutical Executives, PLAIN DEALER,
Feb. 27, 2019.
184
BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD OF NEW MEXICO, 2019 PROVIDER REFERENCE MANUAL
14-9,
Mar.
2019,
https://www.bcbsnm.com/pdf/provider_ref_manual/prov_man_toc.pdf#page=113.
The eight medications are Bosulif®, Lysodren®, Nexavar®, Sutent®, Tarceva®,
Targretin®, Zolinza®, and Zytiga®.
185
ClearScript,
Partial
Fill
Program,
Jan.
2017,
https://www.preferredone.com/shared/ClearScript%20Partial%20Fill%20Program.p
df.
186
See supra Part II.C.
187
See supra notes 135-137.
188
See supra notes 141-145.
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Antitrust enforcement should be used in a creative and
aggressive manner to seek to prevent the worst excesses in the specialty
drug marketplace. As an example of a contemporary tying case, CVS
Health was recently sued for allegedly tying its services to the services
of its wholly acquired 340B 189 drug pricing program administrator
Wellpartner. 190 CVS Health required its covered hospitals to use
Wellpartner for its 340B program. 191 One of the plaintiffs, Sentry Data
Systems, has settled its case against CVS. 192
In a less successful challenge, Prime Aid sued Humana Inc.,
alleging that Humana forced its insurance beneficiaries to use its
wholly-owned pharmacy, Humana Pharmacy Solutions, Inc. 193 Prime
Aid’s lawsuit was dismissed in the summer of 2017. 194 The court noted
that Humana agreed to provide both services—health insurance and
specialty pharmacy services—simultaneously in its insurance
contracts. 195 Therefore, the entity that contracted with Humana for
insurance services was on notice and agreed to Humana’s specialty
pharmacy restriction. 196
Further, the court found that beneficiaries were not “locked-in”
to Humana, as they had the option of purchasing different insurance
plans every year during reenrollment. 197 Although patients may have
hesitated to change health plans because of concerns about continuity
of care, this concern did not constitute a lock-in, according to the
district court. 198

189
American Hospital Association, Fact Sheet: The 340B Drug Pricing Program,
https://www.aha.org/factsheet/2018-03-29-fact-sheet-340b-drug-pricing-program
(accessed July 22, 2019) (“Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act requires
pharmaceutical manufacturers participating in Medicaid to sell outpatient drugs at
discounted prices to health care organizations that care for many uninsured and lowincome patients.”).
190
Meg McEvoy, CVS Facing Twin Lawsuits Over Conduct in Drug Market,
BLOOMBERG LAW, May 29, 2018, https://bnanews.bna.com/health-law-andbusiness/cvs-facing-twin-lawsuits-over-conduct-in-drug-market.
191
Id.
192
Sentry Data Systems reaches settlement agreement with CVS and Wellpartner,
Sentry Data Systems, Sept. 20, 2019, https://www.sentryds.com/sentry-datasystems-reaches-settlement-agreement-with-cvs-and-wellpartner/.
193
Prime Aid Pharmacy Corp. v. Humana Inc., Case No. 16-2104, 2017 WL 3420933
(D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2017).
194
Id. at 3.
195
Prime Aid Pharmacy Corp. v. Humana Inc., Case No. 16-2104, 2017 WL 3420933
(D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2017) at 2.
196
Id.; Specialty Pharmacy’s Antitrust Claim Against Humana Fails, INSURANCE
ANTITRUST NEWSLETTER, Baker Donelson, Aug. 31, 2017, available at
https://www.bakerdonelson.com/new-jersey-specialty-pharmacys-antitrust-claimagainst-humana-fails (last accessed Jul. 20, 2019).
197
Prime Aid Pharmacy Corp. v. Humana Inc., supra note 193, at 3.
198
Id.
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An example of a successful challenge to a manufacturer’s tying
practice is the 1992 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) case against
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals. 199 The FTC alleged that Sandoz illegally
bundled its schizophrenia drug, Clozaril, with blood-monitoring
services that patients could obtain from other providers. 200 The case was
resolved through a consent order prohibiting Sandoz from engaging is
such tying.
It is often difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in antitrust cases.
However, some of the hallmarks of the specialty drug and pharmacy
marketplace raise concerns about anti-competitive behavior that could
be ripe for antitrust challenges.
B. Overcoming the ERISA Problem
It is natural for the states to regulate insurance and take the lead
in combatting unfair and prohibitively costly specialty drug policies. 201
The primary obstacle to comprehensive protection at the state level is
the ERISA preemption problem, noted several times in this Article. 202
This section explains relevant provisions of the ERISA statute. It also
analyzes how Congress could empower states to regulate specialty
drugs effectively and how it could develop relevant legislation on its
own. All alternatives involve advantages and disadvantages, and there
is no easy answer as to how reform is most likely to be achieved. For
purposes of this Article we do not take a position as to which path is
most promising but urge only that Congress tackle the specialty drug
problem in the near future.
1. ERISA Background

199

Federal Trade Commission, supra note 168; Patricia M. Danzon, Competition
and Antitrust Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, p. 34,
https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Competitionand-Antitrust-Issues-in-the-Pharmaceutical-IndustryFinal7.2.14.pdf (July 2014).
200
Mark A. Hurwitz, Bundling Patented Drugs and Medical Services: An Antitrust
Analysis, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1188, 1188 (1991).
201
Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., State Options To Control Health Care Costs And
AFFFS.
BLOG,
Apr.
28,
2016,
Improve
Quality,
HEALTH
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160428.054672/full/
(“The
current political environment makes it unlikely that reforms to control system-wide
health care costs will be achieved at the federal level in the near future. States,
however, are well-positioned to take the lead on implementing cost control and
quality improvement reforms.”); National Conference of State Legislatures, Health
Insurance Regulations, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-insurance/healthinsurance-regulations.aspx (last visited June 15, 2019) (“In general terms, all 50 states
regulate health insurance.”).
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A further explanation of ERISA will provide useful context.
ERISA is a federal law that governs employer-provided retirement and
health plans. 203 Employer-provided health plans cover approximately
152 million Americans and thus are a critical component of the
insurance landscape. 204
ERISA includes a preemption provision establishing that the
statute “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee [health] benefit plan.” 205 However,
the statute includes a significant preemption exception. ERISA’s
savings clause provides that ERISA does not preempt state laws that
regulate insurance. 206 Thus, for example, a 1985 Supreme Court
decision upheld a Massachusetts statute mandating that group
insurance policies provide particular minimum benefits and found that
it was not preempted by ERISA. 207
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that ERISA’s “deemer
clause” rolls back the savings clause exception, providing that state
laws regulating insurance are preempted with respect to self-funded
health insurance plans. 208 According to the Supreme Court, selffunded plans by which employers pay workers’ medical claims out of
pocket do not sufficiently resemble the “business of insurance,” and
states cannot deem them to be insurance plans for regulatory
purposes. 209 Because over sixty percent of individuals with employerprovided health benefits (approximately one-third of the country’s nonelderly population) are now in self-insured plans, this exception to the
exception significantly impedes state regulatory efforts. 210
2. Revising or Eliminating the Deemer Clause and the Option
of Waivers

203

United States Department of Labor, Health Plans & Benefits: ERISA,
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans/erisa (last visited June 15, 2019).
204
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018 Employer Health Benefits Survey Section Three: Employee Coverage, Eligibility, and Participation, Oct. 3, 2018,
https://www.kff.org/report-section/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey-section-3employee-coverage-eligibility-and-participation/.
205
Id.
206
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2010) (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance…”).
207
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 724 (1985).
208
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(B) (2010); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. at 747.
209
Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Federalism, ERISA, and State
Single-Payer Health Care, 168 U. PA. L. REV. ___, 46 (forthcoming 2020).
210
Erin C. Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari; Removing ERISA’s Impediment to State
Health Reform, 378 N. ENGL. J. MED. 5, 6 (2018); Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra
note 209, at 47.
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To broaden the reach of state regulatory initiatives, Congress
could revisit ERISA and either eliminate the deemer clause altogether
or modify its language to state explicitly that it does not apply to selffunded plans. 211 It is likely that Congress never intended to exempt the
majority of employer-provided health plans from state regulation. As
Professors Fuse Brown and McCuskey note in a recent article, when
Congress passed ERISA in 1974, only seven percent of individuals
with employer-provided health coverage were enrolled in self-funded
plans. 212 Forty-five years ago the deemer clause affected only a very
small percent of American patients. The same is not true today.
However, repealing or amending the deemer clause may be an
aspirational and unrealistic solution. Self-insured employers are likely
to lobby vigorously against such a change, arguing that state law
mandates could significantly raise their costs. 213 Moreover, large
employers with facilities in multiple states will object to the burden of
tracking and complying with inconsistent state law requirements.
Nevertheless, amending ERISA would enable states to maintain their
autonomy, tailor solutions to their own populations, and experiment
creatively with different specialty drug policies.
An alternative to revising or eliminating the deemer clause
would be to amend ERISA in order to establish a waiver process by
which different sections of the statute could be waived, allowing for
reasonable regulation of specialty drugs. 214 Professors Fuse Brown and
McCuskey propose the creation of such a waiver process—one that
“would lift the gate for certain state efforts” 215
As they argue, an ERISA waiver could be flexible, and could
“delegate to an agency the power to suspend certain core statutory
rules” within ERISA. 216 This would likely involve a procedure
whereby states could file an application for a waiver with the
Department of Labor. 217 Additionally, as they note, it would “shift
some of the authority over state health reform options from courts to
agencies, relying on agencies’ substantive expertise rather than courts’
preemption precedents.” 218 For our purposes, it would give enterprising
states the much-needed ability to regulate the specialty drug market.

211

Fuse Brown & Sarpatwari, supra note 210, at 7; Fuse Brown & McCuskey, supra
note 209, at 69-70.
212
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213
Id. at 72.
214
Id. at 72. For work analyzing the use of waivers in health policy, see Elizabeth Y.
McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur and Health Reform Preemption, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
1099 (2017).
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3. Federal Statute Addressing Specialty Drugs
Finally, Congress could address specialty drug concerns
directly through a federal statute. Unlike state law, a federal law
governing specialty drugs would not be preempted by ERISA. 219
The time may be ripe for such legislation. In 2018, Congress
enacted two laws relating to PBMs: the Know the Lowest Price Act of
2018 220 and the Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act. 221 These
statutes prohibit prescription drug plans from instituting “gag clauses”
that would not allow pharmacies to inform patients that they could pay
less for certain prescriptions if they did not use their insurance and
simply paid retail drug prices. 222
Congress has also considering other proposals that would
constrain PBMs. As noted above, a bill introduced in the 115th
Congress, the Patients' Access to Treatment Act, 223 sought to limit
patients’ cost-sharing for specialty tier drugs, though it was not
ultimately successful. 224 In 2019, Senators Lamar Alexander and Patty
Murray proposed an ambitious, bipartisan bill called the “Lower Health
Care Costs Act of 2019,” 225 which is under discussion at the time of
this writing. In part, the proposal tackles the problem of “surprise
billing.” 226 To that end, the proposal would require all health care
providers working in in-network facilities to accept in-network rates
even if they are out-of-network clinicians. 227 A second part of the draft
legislation bans PBMs’ practice of spread pricing, by which PBMs
219
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Pub. L. No. 115–262, 132 Stat. 3670 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w– 104).
221
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222
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Medicare or Medicare Advantage and the Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act
applies to all other health insurance plans and pharmacy benefits managers.
223
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224
See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
225
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reimburse a pharmacy a particular dollar amount for a filled
prescription but charge the insurer a higher price for the drug and then
keep the difference. 228 The bill includes numerous other proposals,
though none focuses on specialty drugs. 229
Congress could further develop legislation relating to specialty
drugs. The bill could include mandates concerning specialty drug
designation, specialty tier charges, conflict of interest, and patient
choice. Admittedly, however, passing any legislation that is likely to
face opposition from insurers requires great political will. In the
current political climate, achieving bipartisan agreement might be
particularly challenging.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Specialty drugs are a significant component of the American
health care cost crisis, but they often fly under the radar of policy
makers and scholars. Controlling drug spending is a top priority for
American consumers according to public opinion polls. 230 It is wrong
to assume that specialty drugs merit special deference and a hands-off
approach. Quite to the contrary, they are often designated as specialty
drugs at the whim of PBMs and are no more complex than many other
drugs. The operations of PBMs, manufacturers, and pharmacies in the
specialty drug space raise significant questions about drug
classification, drug pricing, conflict of interest, patient choice, and
antitrust violations. State and federal authorities must fashion remedies
that protect specialty drug consumers against abuses such as
unreasonable cost-sharing and PBM profiteering through their own
specialty pharmacies. Such protections would constitute a meaningful
step towards making American health care more affordable and
accessible for severely ill patients.

228
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